A federal judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted most of Drexel University’s motion for summary judgment against Kim Gunter but has allowed her hostile work environment claims to move forward.
As the Triangle previously reported, on April 8, former Drexel Vice President and University Chief Compliance and Privacy Officer Kim Gunter sued Drexel on six counts of employment discrimination based on race, color, sex and a hostile work environment.
Executive Vice President, Treasurer, and Chief Operating Officer Helen Bowman is alleged to have described the lawsuit in a text message to another employee as “shit!” and “21 pages of crap!”
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the plaintiff must first establish a “prima facie” case by providing evidence of four elements: she is a member of a protected class, she is qualified for her position, she suffered an adverse employment action and the action could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination. If a “prima facie” case is established, the burden shifts to the employer to identify a legitimate non-discriminatory reason. Then, the burden shifts back on the plaintiff to prove that the employer is using the reason as a pretext for discrimination.
A defendant can file a motion for summary judgment for a court to judge whether either side’s burdens were met. The motion is granted if the party opposing the motion cannot meet these burdens when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. In this case, Drexel filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss Gunter’s claims.
In her complaint, Gunter, a Black female, alleged that she was treated differently than her predecessor, a white male, by her subordinate Bill Shea, the Associate Vice President and Chief Audit Executive. Shea claimed that he reports to the Audit Committee for operational purposes but to Gunter for administrative purposes, such as signing timesheets. When Gunter tried to exercise control over Shea, he complained, and other administrators expressed confusion at his complaints and pointed out that he had no problem with Gunter’s predecessor. Throughout Gunter’s employment, Shea continued to reject her authority, and Gunter complained to Drexel. The Internal Audit Department was eventually removed from her oversight at her request.
Judge Joshua Wolson ruled that because Shea did not have a negative working relationship with Gunter’s predecessor, he cannot serve as an appropriate comparator as to how an employee of a different race, color or sex might be treated. Thus, Gunter’s lawsuit fails to provide evidence that gives rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.
The judge also ruled that Drexel provides the legitimate non-discriminatory reason of not getting along, and Gunter has no evidence to refute that claim, so her claims of pretext are summarily dismissed.
Gunter’s claim of retaliation is dismissed because she failed to show that she suffered a materially adverse harm; in fact, she asked to have Internal Audit removed from her responsibility. Her claim of punitive damages fails due to a lack of presented evidence that Drexel had the subjective belief that it was violating the law.
However, because the evidence could be interpreted to show that Drexel did not do enough to stop Shea’s insubordination after the first verbal warning, her claims of a hostile work environment survived summary judgment. Gunter lost her motion to reconsider on the grounds that she filed too late and did not bring up anything new for consideration. The case is scheduled to proceed to trial on May 12, 2025.
Judge Wolson wrote, “Ms. Gunter has offered just enough evidence to suggest that Mr. Shea (and his subordinates) treated Ms. Gunter the way they did because of her sex, race, and color, and she has evidence that Drexel knew about it and didn’t do enough to stop it.”